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Abstract
This addendum provides generalizations of Proposition 1 for the cases of multiple
sectors and tradable intermediate goods discussed in Section 5 of our main paper.1 Extension (I): Multiple Sectors
1.1 Assumptions
Preferences, Technology, and Market Structure. It is standard to interpret models with
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, such as the one presented in Section 3 of our main paper, as ￿one-
sector￿models with a continuum of ￿varieties￿ . Under this interpretation, our model can be
extended to multiple sectors, s = 1;:::;S, by assuming that the representative agent has a
two-tier utility function, with the upper-tier being Cobb-Douglas, with consumption shares
1 ￿ ￿s ￿ 0, and the lower-tier being Dixit-Stiglitz with elasticity of substitution ￿s > 1. Under
















1￿￿s is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index associated with varieties
from sector s. For each sector s, primitive assumptions on technology and market structure are
as described in Section 3 of our main paper. Superscripts s denote all sector-level variables.
Macro-level Restrictions. In this extension we use the following counterparts of R1-R3:












i=1 Xji. This is equivalent to wjLj+￿j￿
wjNjFj =
Pn
i=1 Xji since wjLj +￿j ￿wjNjFj =
Pn
i=1 Xij by country j￿ s representative agent￿ s
budget constraint. R1(MS) is simply the sector-level counterpart of the previous expression.
R2 (MS) For any country j and any sector s, ￿s
j = ￿Rs
j with ￿ 2 [0;1].
Compared to R2 in the one-sector case, R2(MS) states that aggregate pro￿ts are a constant
share of revenues in each sector, but also that the share of pro￿ts ￿ is common across sectors.
R3 (MS) The import demand system is such that for any sector s, any importer j, and
any pair of exporters i 6= j and i0 6= j, "sii0
j = "s < 0 if i = i0 and zero otherwise, with
"sii0








Note that R3(MS) allows the trade elasticities "s to vary across sectors.
11.2 Welfare Evaluation
Under the previous assumptions, Proposition 1 generalizes to:
Proposition 1 (MS) Suppose that R1-R3(MS) hold. Then the change in real income associ-























under monopolistic competition with free entry.
Proof. Like in our main paper, we consider separately the cases of perfect and monopolistic
competition and use labor in country j as our numeraire, wj = 1. For expositional purposes,
we describe in detail the steps of the proof that are distinct from those in Appendix A of our
main paper and omit others.
Case 1: Perfect competition
By the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 1), we have dlnYj = 0. Combining this observation




























which completes our proof under perfect competition.
Case 2: Monopolistic Competition
Using the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 1), we ￿rst show that dlnYj = 0. Under free
entry we know that Yj = Lj, which immediately implies dlnYj = 0. Under restricted entry, we









j for all s =
1;:::;S by R2(MS), we thus have Yj = Lj +￿Yj. Totally di⁄erentiating the previous expression,
we get dYj = 0 and thus dlnYj = 0. Since dlnYj = 0 under monopolistic competition, the




















Using the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 5), let us now show that dlnNs
j = dlnLs
j, under
free entry, and dlnNs






j. By R1(MS) and free entry, we know that dlnLs
j = dlnRs
j.
By R2(MS), we also know that dlnRs
j = dln￿s
j. Combining the previous series of equations,
we obtain dlnNs
j = dlnLs





j = 0. The last part of the proof is the same as under perfect competition and omitted.
QED
2 Extension (II): Tradable Intermediate Goods
2.1 Assumptions
Preferences, Technology, and Market Structure. The primitive assumptions on pref-
erences and market structure are the same as in Section 3 of our main paper. In terms of
technology, however, we now allow goods ! 2 ￿ to be used in the production of other goods.
Formally, we assume that all goods can be aggregated into a unique intermediate good using
the same Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator as for ￿nal consumption. Thus Pi now represents both the
consumer price index in country i and the price of intermediate goods in this country. In this
extension, the cost function for each good ! is given by
Ci (w;P;q;t;!) =
Pn
j=1 [cij (wi;Pi;tj;!)qj + fij (wi;Pi;wj;Pj;tj;!)1 I(qj > 0)],
3where P ￿ fPig is the vector of intermediate good prices. In line with the previous literature
we further assume that constant marginal costs and ￿xed exporting costs can be written as




i ￿ ￿ij (!) ￿ t
1
1￿￿,








i ) ￿ ￿ij (!) ￿ mij (t),
with ￿ 2 [0;1] governing the share of intermediate goods in variable and ￿xed production costs.
Similarly, we assume that ￿xed entry costs (if any) are given by w￿
i P
1￿￿
i Fi, with ￿ 2 [0;1]
governing the share of intermediate goods in entry costs.
Macro-level Restrictions. In this extension our ￿rst two macro-level restrictions, R1(TI)
and R2(TI), are exactly the same as in Section 3 of our main paper. R3(TI) still requires the
import demand system to be such that for any importer j and any pair of exporters i 6= j and
i0 6= j, "ii0
j = " < 0 if i = i0, and zero otherwise. The only di⁄erence with Section 3 of our main
paper is that the import demand system now refers to the mapping from (w;P;N;￿) into X,
and, so the partial elasticities "ii0
j also hold ￿xed the price of intermediate goods, P.1
2.2 Welfare Evaluation
Under the previous assumptions, Proposition 1 generalizes to:
Proposition 1 (TI) Suppose that R1-R3(TI) hold. Then the change in real income associated
with any foreign shock in country j can be computed as c Wj = b ￿
1/"￿
jj , under perfect competition;









jj , under monopolistic competition with free entry.
Proof. Like in the previous proof, we consider separately the cases of perfect and monopolistic
competition and use labor in country j as our numeraire, wj = 1. For expositional purposes,
we again describe in detail the steps of the proof that are distinct from those in Appendix A of




i and cij ￿ ￿ijci.
Case 1: Perfect competition
1This generalization of the de￿nition of the import demand system re￿ ects the fact that there are now two
inputs in production, labor and the aggregate intermediate goods, with prices given by w and P, respectively.
4By the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 1), we have dlnYj = 0, which implies
dlnWj = ￿dlnPj. (2)





Finally, by the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 3), small changes in expenditure shares satisfy
dln￿ij￿dln￿jj =
￿



























ij is given by the same expression as in Appendix A. Compared to Appendix A, the


























Following the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 4), it is easy to check that Equation (4) and
R3(TI) imply 1 ￿ ￿ + ￿i
ij ￿ ￿i
jj = ", for all i 6= j, and ￿i0
ij = ￿i0
jj for all i0 6= i;j. Combining this

















Using the de￿nition of ￿i0




































5By de￿nition of cjj and our choice of numeraire, we know that dlncjj = (1 ￿ ￿)dlnPj. Thus










The rest of the proof is the same as in Appendix A (Step 5).
Case 2: Monopolistic Competition
Using the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 1), we ￿rst show that dlnYj = dlnRj = 0.
Note that compared to Appendix A, the ￿rst of these two equalities is no longer a trivial
implication of R1(TI): whereas total revenues are still Rj =
Pn
i=1 Xji, the total expenditure
of the representative agent in country j is now Yj 6=
Pn
i=1 Xij since total imports also include
expenditures on intermediate goods by ￿rms from country j. Let us start with the case of
free entry. Under free entry we know that Yj = Lj, which immediately implies dlnYj = 0.
By R1(TI), R2(TI), and our Cobb-Douglas assumptions, we also know that total payments to
labor are ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Rj + ￿P
1￿￿
j NjFj, which must be equal to Lj. Since free entry and R2(TI)
imply that P
1￿￿
j NjFj = ￿Rj, we then have Lj = [￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿]Rj, hence dlnRj = 0 as well.
Let us now turn to the case of restricted entry. Under restricted entry, R1(TI), R2(TI), and our
Cobb-Douglas assumptions imply that total payments to labor are ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Rj, which must be
equal to Lj. This immediately implies dlnRj = 0. By R2(TI) and the budget constraint of
the representative agent in country j, we also know that Yj = Lj + ￿Rj. Since dlnRj = 0, this
implies that dlnYj = 0. Like in Appendix A (Step 1), dlnYj = 0 immediately implies
dlnWj = ￿dlnPj. (8)
The next part of the proof follows closely Steps 2 through 4 in Appendix A. Compared to
Appendix A, the main di⁄erence is that, like under perfect competition before, we now have
dlncj 6= 0. Using ￿￿
ij ￿ ￿
￿







together with the fact that dlnRj =







1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿j
￿￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ij
￿



















where ￿ij and ￿j are given by the same expressions as in Appendix A. Similarly, by the same
logic as in Appendix A (Step 3), small changes in expenditure shares satisfy
dln￿ij ￿ dln￿jj =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ij
￿


















jj + dlnNi ￿ dlnNj.











1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿j
￿￿
















Following the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 4), it is easy to check that Equation (10) and










By de￿nition of cj and our choice of numeraire, we know that dlncj = (1 ￿ ￿)dlnPj. Thus
small changes in the consumer price index satisfy
dlnPj =
￿dln￿jj + dlnNj





7Finally, by the same logic as in Appendix A (Step 5), we must have dlnNj = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)dlnPj
under free entry (since dlnRj = 0); and dlnNj = 0 under restricted entry (since Nj = Nj).










￿￿1+1)+(1￿￿) , under monopolistic competition with free entry.
The last part of the proof is the same as under perfect competition. QED
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